tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-18997019.post8212650070044947550..comments2023-10-29T11:27:16.433-04:00Comments on HL7 Watch: HL7 attempts to get things clear about its own use of the word 'concept'Barry Smithhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04280256497568985237noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-18997019.post-47489419352022430552011-07-06T17:54:00.800-04:002011-07-06T17:54:00.800-04:00A fundamental problem here is that concepts are no...A fundamental problem here is that concepts are not the fundamental unit of meaning, which emerges in a complex way in language. So even if it were possible to do so, standardising concepts does not enable system interoperability.gemstesthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10729764967579788379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-18997019.post-54978936041091229152011-07-01T16:42:58.267-04:002011-07-01T16:42:58.267-04:00Another problem with the document as it currently ...Another problem with the document as it currently stands is that it says that the combination of symbols for arm and for left constitute a concept representation.<br /><br />Well, if a concept representation represents a concept, and if a concept is an atomic unit of thought, then a combination of two concept representations cannot represent a concept, because what the combination represents is no longer atomic or unitary.<br /><br />That is, if left and arm are concepts, and "left" and "arm" represent those concepts; then combining the two symbols into "left arm" means that left arm is not a concept. The reason is that left arm is not an atomic unit of thought. It is more of a "molecule" (scare quotes) of thought. Thus the representation of left arm cannot be a concept representation because what it represents--left arm--is not atomic and therefore not a concept.<br /><br />So, the process of combining representations must create some other kind of representations besides concept representations. Regardless, according to the definitions of "concept" and "concept representation", combinations of concept representations by definition do not represent concepts and thus are not concept representations.Spero meliorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02901243791277286329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-18997019.post-64334258133638007942011-07-01T08:40:21.352-04:002011-07-01T08:40:21.352-04:00I would add that if concepts are mental representa...I would add that if concepts are mental representations or thoughts, how on earth are we supposed to standardize them? Does that require that we wire everyone's neuronal connections the same way, which assumes, of course, that mental representations and thoughts can be reduced to such connections. And if we take a non-reductionist approach to mental representations and thoughts, the problem of standardizing them remains, and is probably more difficult.<br /><br />Another problem is that the structure of mental representations and thoughts are fuzzy things, even to those that have them. What in fact is an atom or unit of thought? How do I know if I'm down to something atomic when it comes to thought?<br /><br />If I think of a book on my desk, is that thought an atom? What if I'm thinking about my set of Winston Churchill's six books "The Second World War". One thought or six? Or what if I'm thinking about a meeting yesterday and think of an exchange between two people, each utterance in succession. If it's more than one thought (maybe one thought per utterance, or perhaps those utterances I'm remembering involve multiple thoughts themselves), where does one thought begin and another end?<br /><br />What are the identity criteria for thoughts and mental representations? How do they come into existence? How and when do they go out of existence?<br /><br />And if no one is thinking of the element Samarium at a particular moment in time, does that mean the chemical symbol of Sm does not refer to any thought or mental representation at that moment?Spero meliorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02901243791277286329noreply@blogger.com